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1 Introduction
Reserve systems have been designed and implemented to allocate scarce resources in the
presence of diversity and affirmative action considerations in a variety of real-world prob-
lems. Notable examples include:
• allocation of publicly funded school seats and government-sponsored job positions
in India (Baswana et al. 2018 and 2019; Aygün and Turhan 2017, 2020, and 2021;
Thakur 2018; Sönmez and Yenmez 2020 and 2021),
• college admission in Brazil with multidimensional privileges (Aygün and Bó 2020),
• school choice in Boston and Chile (Dur et al. 2018; Correa et al. 2019),
• immigration visas in the US (Pathak et al. 2020),
• allocation of vaccines, ventilators, and other medical resources (Pathak et al. 2020;
Aziz and Brandl 2021), and
• Mechinot gap-year programs in Israel (Gonczarowski et al. 2020).
In reserve systems, certain fractions of available objects/positions are set aside for differ-
ent reserve categories. Each reserve category has its own priority order over individuals.
Institutions process reserve categories sequentially1 to fill their positions, according to a
pre-specified order referred to as a processing sequence. Reserve categories allocate their
units to the individuals, who have not yet been allotted a unit on the basis of their priori-
ties. Priorities may vary from one reserve category to another to accommodate affirmative
action constraints or to promote diversity, among other objectives.
In almost all real-world applications, most reserve categories are exclusive in the sense
that only applicants with certain types or characteristics are considered. That is, if positions
in a reserve category can only be allocated to individuals with a certain characteristic, then
all other individuals who do not possess this characteristic are deemed unqualified and are
unacceptable according to the priority ordering of this reserve category.2 It is highly com-
mon for the number of available positions to outnumber the number of applicants of such
1Delacretaz (2020) formulates a model where categories allocate their unit/positions simultaneously.
2In vaccine allocation during COVID-19, for example, frontline healthcare workers and people who live
in care homes are considered as exclusive reserve categories. In Brazilian college admission, low-income
minority students from public high schools are an example of an exclusive reserve category. In government-
sponsored job allocation in India, candidates from Scheduled Castes are an example of an exclusive reserve
category.
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exclusive reserve categories. Therefore, objects may be unassigned or positions may be
unfilled in such exclusive reserve categories.3 To alleviate this issue, de-reservation poli-
cies have been introduced along with accompanying reservation policies. De-reservation
is simply a process of providing the unallocated objects/positions for the use of others. It
can be interpreted as transferring units or positions from low-demand reserve categories to
high-demand ones.
The lack of de-reservation policies may cause confusion, and even have legal con-
sequences. Examples have been seen during the COVID-19 vaccine allocation in many
countries. Almost all countries implement a reserve system to allocate vaccines, starting
with vaccinating frontline healthcare workers followed by elderly in care homes. Most
countries did not specify de-reservation policies for when they have leftover doses. In Aus-
tria, for example, the government did not provide guidelines for handling leftover doses
before vaccine distribution started. Local authorities allocated leftover vaccines according
to their own judgments and have been accused of jumping the queue, some have faced legal
challenges.4
De-reservation policies are necessary in many real-world allocation problems. More-
over, the implementation of de-reservation policies is consequential. When de-reservation
policy is not designed and/or implemented carefully, allocation procedures as a whole
might have serious shortcomings, no matter how well-designed the reserve system is. Re-
serve policies have been well-studied in the literature, while de-reservation policies that are
attached to reserve systems have not. This paper aims to fill this crucial gap. As we will
show, the design and implementation of de-reservation policies affects whether the reserve
systems and affirmative action programs can yield the full benefit.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we model the admissions
market of technical universities in India and formulate the currently implemented sequen-
tial mechanism—multi-run deferred acceptance—to handle de-reservations. In the same
section, we disclose its shortcomings. In Section 3, we introduce two families of choice
rules—backward and forward transfers choice rules—to untangle de-reservations and the
deferred acceptance mechanism with respect to these choice rules. We show that our pro-
posals can successfully overcome the shortcomings of the multi-run deferred acceptance
and satisfactorily clear the market. In Section 4, we compare backward and forward trans-
3This has been happening in the allocation of publicly funded school seats in India.
4The news article can be accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/21/austrian-mayors-
who-got-leftover-covid-vaccines-accused-of-queue-jumping (last accessed on 01/23/2021).
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fers choice rules with respect to a comparison criteria on the basis of merit, and with respect
to individuals’ welfare. In the same section, we extend these comparisons to the outcomes
of the DA with respect to these choice rules. Section 5 discusses the related literature and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 Admission Market of Technical Universities in India
The admission process at technical universities in India functions through a centralized
marketplace that matches approximately 1.3 million students to 34,000 university seats.
The process was recently reformed and the new procedure has been adopted beginning in
2015. The reform was the product of collaboration between policymakers and researchers
from computer science and operations research, and was summarized in Baswana et al.
(2018). The authors report the design and implementation of the new procedure, which is
based on the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).
Admissions to publicly funded universities in India are subject to an affirmative action
program that has been implemented via a reservation policy for decades. According to
the reservation policy, each institution sets aside 15 percent of its slots for applicants from
Scheduled Castes (SC), 7.5 percent for applicants from Scheduled Tribes (ST), and 27
percent for applicants from Other Backward Classes (OBC). Applicants who do not belong
to any of these categories are referred to as members of the General Category (GC). The
remaining slots are called open-category slots and are available to everyone, including
applicants from SC, ST, and OBC. In each institution, for slots that are reserved for SC,
ST, and OBC, only applicants who declare they belong to these respective categories are
considered. In each institution, open-category positions are filled first, followed by the
exclusive reserve categories. The processing order of seat categories for different applicant
types is as follows:
• Applicants who declare their SC memberships are first considered for open-category
positions, and then for reserved SC positions,
• Applicants who declare their ST memberships are first considered for open-category
positions, and then for reserved ST positions,
4
• Applicants who declare their OBC memberships are first considered for open-category
positions, and then for reserved OBC positions,
• Applicants who do not declare membership to SC, ST, or OBC are only considered
for open-category positions.
By law, vacant SC/ST positions cannot be de-reserved. By and large, many SC/ST posi-
tions remain vacant and are wasted each year. On the other hand, unfilled OBC positions
must be de-reserved. If there are not sufficient OBC applicants, the unfilled OBC posi-
tions are converted into open-category positions. To model the reserve system and the
de-reservation policy and how they are implemented, we will first formulate the technical
university admissions market.
There is a finite set of institutions ( programs) S = {s1, ...,sm} and a finite set of indi-
viduals I = {i1, ...,in}. We denote the number of available positions at institution s ∈ S
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reserved for SC, ST, and OBC categories. We let R = {SC,ST,OBC} to denote the set of
reserve categories, and let C = {OP,SC,ST,OBC} to denote the set of all categories5. The

















to describe the initial distribution of positions over reserve cate-
gories at institution s. Let q = (qs)s∈S denote a profile of vectors for the initial distribution
of positions over categories (OP, SC, ST,OBC) at institutions. That is, q is a vector of
distribution vectors.
The function t : I → C denotes the category membership of individuals. For every
individual i ∈ I, t(i) ∈ C denotes the category individual i belongs to. In India, it is optional
to report SC, ST, or OBC membership. Reserved category members who do not report
their membership are considered GC applicants and are eligible only for open-category
positions. Members of reserve category r ∈ R are eligible for both open-category positions
and reserved category r positions. We denote a profile of reserved category membership
by T = (t(i))i∈I . Let T be the set of all possible reserved category membership profiles.
The function κ : I ×S → R+ denotes individuals’ merit scores at institutions. Appli-
cants might have different merit scores for different institutions. We let κ(i,s) denote the
5In Baswana et al. (2018), there are special reservations for People with Disabilities (PwD) within each
of these categories. Namely, SC-PwD, ST-PwD, OBC-PwD, and GC-PwD. For the sake of simplicity, we
did not model these. Our model can be straightforwardly extended to a model that also captures these special
categories. All of our results are independent of this simplification and hold in a model that covers special
reservations.
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merit score of individual i at institution s. We assume that no two individuals have the
same score at a given institution6. That is, for all i, j ∈ I and s ∈ S such that i , j, we have
κ(i,s) , κ( j,s). Merit scores induce strict meritorious ranking of individuals at institution s,
denoted s, which is a linear order over I∪ {∅}. i s j means that applicant i has a higher
priority (higher merit score) than applicant j at institution s. That is, κ(i,s) > κ( j,s). We
write i s ∅ to say that applicant i is acceptable for institution s. Similarly, we write ∅ s i
to say that applicant i is unacceptable for institution s. The profile of institutions’ merit lists
is denoted by = (s1, ...,sm). For each institution s ∈ S, the merit ordering for applicants
of type t ∈ R, denoted by ts, is obtained from s in a straightforward manner as follows:
• for i, j ∈ I such that t(i) = t, t( j) , t, i s ∅, and j s ∅, we have i ts ∅ ts j,7
• for any other i, j ∈ I, i ts j if and only if i s j.
Each reserve category t ∈ R is exclusive. That is, all applicants who do not belong to
category t become unacceptable. Among the applicants who belong to category t, the
ranking s is preserved.
Each individual i ∈ I has a strict preference relation Pi over S∪ {∅}, where ∅ denotes
the outside option, i.e., remaining unmatched. We write sPi∅ to mean that institution s is
acceptable for individual i. Similarly, ∅Pis means institution s is unacceptable for indi-
vidual i. We denote the profile of true individual preferences by P = (Pi)i∈I . We denote
by Ri the weak preference relation associated with the strict preference relation Pi, and by
R = (Ri)i∈I as the profile weak preferences.
For each institution s ∈ S, its selection criterion is summarized by a choice function Cs.
A choice function Cs simply selects a subset from any given set of individuals. That is, for
any given I ⊆ I, the chosen set Cs (I) is a subset of I, i.e., Cs (I) ⊆ I. We now introduce a
choice function with reserves CRess that will be key for the rest of our analysis.
Choice Rule with Reserves CRess










, a set of applicants A ⊆
I, and a profile reserve category membership T = (t(i))i∈A for the members of A, the set of
chosen applicants CRess (A,qs), is computed as follows:
6In India, when two or more applicants have the same score, ties are broken with some exogenously given
objective criteria.
7∅ st j means applicant j is unacceptable for category t at institution s.
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Stage 1. Only open-category seats are considered. Individuals are chosen one at a time











, for each reserve cate-
gory t ∈ R, applicants are chosen one at a time following ts up to the capacity q
t
s. Let us







Then, CRess (A,qs) is defined as the union of the set of applicants chosen in stages 1 and
2. That is,
















This is a commonly used sequential choice procedure in practice. Note that the chosen set
is a function of the vector of initial distribution of positions over categories qs.
A choice rule determines who is chosen from any given set of individuals when there
is a single institution. In centralized marketplaces, there are multiple institutions, each of
which has its own selection criteria embodied in its choice rule.
Matching and Stability
A matching specifies, for every institution, the set of individuals who are assigned to that
institution. Mathematically, a matching µ is a function µ : I∪S →I∪S∪ {∅} such that
1. for any individual i ∈ I, µ(i) ∈ S ∪ {∅},
2. for any institution s ∈ S, µ(s) ⊆ I such that | µ(s) |≤ qs,
3. for any individual i ∈ I and institution s ∈ S, µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s).
That is, an individual is either matched with an institution, or the outside option ∅ and an
institution s is matched with a set of individuals that has at most qs individuals. Moreover,
an individual i is assigned to institution s if and only if i is in the set of individuals matched
with s.
Stability has appeared as one of the most important desiderata in the matching markets.
We now give the stability definition with respect to a profile of institutional choice rules
C = (Cs)s∈S .
Definition 1. A matching µ is stable with respect to the profile of applicants’ preferences
P = (Pi)i∈I and a profile choice rules of institutions C = (Cs)s∈S if,
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(i) for every individual i ∈ I, µ(i)Ri∅,
(ii) for every institution s ∈ S, Cs(µ(s)) = µ(s), and
(iii) there is no (i,s) such that sPiµ(i) and i ∈ Cs(µ(s)∪ {i}).
If the first requirement (individual rationality for individuals) fails, then there is an
individual who is assigned to an unacceptable institution. In our context, the second condi-
tion (individual rationality for institutions) requires that the institutions’ selection criteria
summarized in their choice rules are respected. If the third condition (unblockedness) fails,
then there is an alternative matching that an individual and an institution strictly prefers.
Stability depends on how institutions’ selection procedures are defined. In India, for ex-
ample, institutions’ selection criteria embody legal requirements, such as satisfying reser-
vation and de-reservation policies and respecting merit scores subject to affirmative action.
If each individual applies to only one institution, stability requires that the rules and regula-
tions encoded in institutions’ choice rules determine which individuals are selected. Stabil-
ity proves to be a natural desideratum for an allocation: an individual will only be matched
to a less desirable institution if, by following the selection criteria of those institutions, she
would not be accepted given the individuals who have been matched to these institutions.
Unstable allocations, therefore, might lead to lawsuits from dissatisfied applicants.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is a systematic way to map preference and reserve category membership
profiles of individuals to matchings, given institutions’ choice procedures. Technically, a
mechanism ϕ is a function ϕ : P ×T →M, where P denotes the set of all preference
profiles of individuals, T denotes the set of all reserve category membership profiles, and
M denotes the set of all matchings, given a profile of institutional choice rules C= (Cs)s∈S .
A mechanism ϕ is stable if ϕ(P,T) is a stable matching for all pairs (P,T) ∈ P ×T .
One of the main desiderata that also has been key for the success of matching mecha-
nisms in practice is strategy-proofness, according to which submitting the true preferences
is a weakly dominant strategy for each individual.
Definition 2. A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if for every preference profile P and for
every reserve category membership profile T, and for each individual i ∈ I, there is no P̃i,
such that ϕ((P̃i,P−i),T)Piϕ(P,T).
Affirmative action policies are designed to increase admission chances of members of
reserved categories in the sense that the assignment of a reserve category member when
8
she claims her membership is at least as good as the assignment she would receive without
reporting her membership. That is, reporting their membership to reserve categories should
not hurt them. Otherwise, the rationale behind the affirmative action policy is violated. This
idea was first formulated by Aygün and Bó (2020) in the context of college admission in
Brazil with multi-dimensional privileges.
We now formulate this notion for our setting.
Definition 3. A mechanism ϕ is incentive compatible for reserve category membership
revelation if, for every preference profile P ∈ P, there is no individual i ∈ I—who is
a member of reserve category r ∈ R—receives a better assignment by not reporting her















where t′i = GC and ti = r .
2.2 Formulation of the Current De-reservation Procedure
Before formulating the currently implemented de-reservation policy, we describe the DA
algorithm with respect to choice rules with reserves, which will prove useful for describing
the sequential version of DA that is implemented to handle de-reservation policy.
DA Algorithm under Choice Rules with Reserves





is the vector of the reported preference relations and T = (ti)i∈I
is a a vector of reported reserve category membership of individuals. Given institutions’
priority rankings = (s)s∈S and the profile q = (qs)s∈S—therefore, given the choice func-
tion with reserves of each institution s ∈ S, CRess (·;qs)—the outcome of the DA algorithm
with respect to the choice rules with reserves defined above is found as follows:
Step 1. Each individual in I applies to his top choice institution. Let A1s be the set





and rejects the rest.
Step n≥ 2. Each individual who was rejected in the previous step applies to the best
institution that has not rejected him. Let Ans be the union of the set of individuals who
9
were tentatively held by institution s at the end of Step n−1 and the set of new proposers






The deferred acceptance algorithm terminates when there are no rejections. The out-
come of the algorithm is the tentative assignments at that point. We denote the outcome by
Φ(P̃,q) to emphasize the dependence of the outcome on the vector of institutional reserve




be the assignment of individual i.
Baswana et al. (2018) report the new design for the joint seat allocation process for
the technical universities in India that has been implemented since 2015.8 Our focus is the
sequential procedure introduced to deal with de-reservations, which is explained in detail
in Chapter 6 of the technical report Baswana et al. (2019)9.
According to this sequential process, the DA is first run with the initial capacities of
reserve categories at each program. If there are unfilled seats that can be de-reserved in the
resulting matching, then the capacities are updated by transferring the unfilled seats to the
“parent” categories10. Then, the DA is re-run on all individuals with updated capacities of
reserve categories at each institution. If there are no vacant seats that can be de-reserved in
the resulting matching, then the process is terminated. This process is called multi-run DA.
We now formulate this procedure via the multiple iteration of the DA algorithm under
choice rules with reserves.
Multi-run DA Algorithm
Let q = q1 be the profile of initial distribution vector of positions over categories at institu-





, a vector of





s∈S , the multi-run deferred acceptance algorithm runs as follows:
8Their design is a joint seat allocation process for IITs and non-IITs. The proposed mechanism is not a
direct mechanism. Both IITs and non-IITs run their own DA algorithm for multiple rounds, in which applicant
preferences are updated according to which program they accept. At the end of each round, candidates who
accept a seat are provided three options: Float, Slide, or Freeze. Float means the applicant wants to be
upgraded as high as possible on her preference list. Slide means the applicant wants to remain in the same
institute but wants the most desirable program available. Freeze means the applicant wants to remain at the
assigned program for the rest of the procedure. See Baswana et al. (2019) for algorithmic details. The authors
also take other constraints into account, such as non-nested quotas, that we do not model for simplicity, as
we mainly focus on the de-reservation policy.
9The report can be accessed at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.06698.pdf (last accessed on 02/24/2021).
10Open-category, for example, is a parent category for OBC.
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Iteration 1. Run the DA with initial distributions of positions over categories q1. That




to select applicants during the DA steps. Let
r1s be the number of vacant OBC seats. Update the number of open-category and OBC
positions by transferring r1s many positions from OBC to open-category. Let q2 be the
profile of updated distributions of positions over categories.
Iteration n (n≥2). Run the DA with the updated distributions of reserved categories qn.




to select applicants during the DA steps.
Let rns be the number of vacant OBC seats. Update the number of open-category and OBC
positions by transferring rns many positions from OBC to open-category. Let qn+1 be the
profile of updated distributions of positions over categories.
The algorithm terminates when there is no vacant position that can be de-reserved at
any institution.




, where L is the number of iter-
ations needed, and qL denotes the profile of updated distribution of positions at institutions





To explain how distributions over reserve categories is updated during the multi-run DA
algorithm, we now provide a simple example with a single institution.
Example 1. Suppose there are ten individuals with following category memberships and
exam scores:











Consider institution s with ten positions. Suppose the initial distribution of positions over
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categories is
(OP,SC,ST,OBC) = (5,1,1,3) .
In the first iteration, the first five positions, i.e., open-category positions, are assigned to
individuals i1,i2,i3,i4, and i5. Individual i6 is assigned to one of the three reserved positions
for OBC. Two reserved OBC positions remain unfilled. The reserved position for SC is
assigned to i7. Similarly, the reserved position for ST is assigned to i8. In total, eight
individuals are assigned positions. Since two OBC positions remained vacant, the initial
seat allocation is updated as (7,1,1,1).
In the second iteration, open-category positions are assigned to {i1,i2,i3,i4,i5,i6,i7}. In-
dividual i8 is assigned to reserved ST position. Since i9 and i10 are GC individuals, the
reserved SC and OBC seats remain vacant. The vacant OBC seat is transferred to open-
category. Hence, the new distribution over reserve categories becomes (8,1,1,0).
In the third iteration, open-category positions are assigned to {i1,i2,i3,i4,i5,i6,i7,i8}.
Since i9 and i10 are GC individuals, the reserved SC and ST seats remain unfilled. There-
fore, even though there are individuals who are unassigned, two positions are wasted.
In this example, two of the three positions transferred from OBC to open-category are
taken by SC and ST individuals. Since unfilled SC/ST positions cannot be transferred, this
causes vacancies in reserve categories SC and ST. Therefore, the full benefit of de-reserving
vacant OBC seats into open-category cannot be achieved. This example emphasizes the
distributional consequences of the order at which categories are processed and the way
de-reservations are implemented.
More importantly, when the DA is re-run to adjust the capacities of categories to handle
de-reservations, it may incentivize individuals to misreport their preferences.
Proposition 1. The multi-run DA mechanism is manipulable via preference misreporting.
Proof. Suppose that there are two institutions a and b, each of which has two seats. Both
schools reserve one seat for OBC candidates and consider the other seat as open-category.
There are four applicants: i1, i2, i3, and i4. Suppose ti1 = ti2 = GC and ti3 = ti4 =OBC. The
merit scores of applicants are ranked from highest to lowest as i1 − i2 − i3 − i4. The true
preferences of applicants are given below:
i1 i2 i3 i4
a a b b
b b a a
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
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We first compute the outcome of the Multi-Run DA under the true preferences. In the first
iteration of the deferred acceptance, applicants i1 and i2 are considered in institution a,
while applicants i3 and i4 are considered in institution b. Since i1 and i2 are GC candidates,
they are considered only for an open-category seat in institution a. i1 is tentatively held for
the open-category seat while i2 is rejected. In institution b, applicant i3 is tentatively held by
the open-category seat and applicant i4 is tentatively held by the OBC seat. Now, i2 applies
to b. Institution b holds i2 for the open-category seat and i3 for the OBC seat. Applicant i4




. The first iteration of the deferred acceptance is the final iteration and
no de-reservation occurs. Note that i2 is assigned her second choice institution.
Now, consider the following preferences, where i2 misreports by stating a as the only
acceptable alternative (i.e., she truncates).
i1 i2 i3 i4
a a b b
b ∅ a a
∅ ∅ ∅
In the first iteration of the deferred acceptance, applicants i1 and i2 are considered in in-
stitution a, while applicants i3 and i4 are considered in institution b. Since i1 and i2 are
GC candidates, they are considered only for an open-category seat in institution a. i1 is
tentatively held for the open-category seat while i2 is rejected. Since i2 has no other institu-






Since there is a vacant OBC slot in institution a, it is de-reserved and the capacity of the
open-category is set to 2 and deferred acceptance is re-run on all candidates. In the sec-
ond iteration, both i1 and i2 are held by the open-category seats of a. Applicants i3 and






, where each applicant is assigned their top choices.
Therefore, by misreporting, applicant i2 receives a strictly better outcome. 
Moreover, the multi-run DA mechanism provides an advantage to individuals who can
strategize by not revealing their reserve category membership.
Proposition 2. The multi-run DA mechanism is manipulable via not reporting reserve cat-
13
egory membership.






when both i3 and i4 truthfully report their OBC membership under
the given true preference profile. Now suppose that individual i4 does not report her OBC
membership, and, therefore, she is considered only for open-category positions.
In the first iteration of DA, individuals i1 and i2 apply to institution a, while applicants
i3 and i4 apply to institution b in the first step. Since i1 and i2 are GC candidates, they
are considered only for an open-category seat in institution a. i1 is tentatively held for the
open-category seat while i2 is rejected. In institution b, both i3 and i4 are first considered
for the open-category position. Since i3 has a higher score, i4 gets rejected. Note that since
i4 did not claim her OBC membership, she gets rejected from institution b. In the second
step of the DA, i2 applies to b and i4 applies to a. At institution b, individual i2 receives the
open-category position by replacing i3 and i3 receives the reserved OBC slot. At institution
a, i1 keeps her open-category position and i4 is rejected. Therefore, the first DA iteration





. Since the OBC position in institution a remains
unfilled, it is set as an open-category position for the second iteration of DA.
We now run the second DA iteration on all individuals. i1 and i2 apply to a, and they
are both assigned to open-category positions since a has two open-category positions now.
i3 and i4 apply to institution b. i3 is assigned to the open-category position and i4 gets
rejected since she can be considered only for open-category positions and has a lower
score than i3. In the second step of the second iteration of DA, i4 applies to her second
choice, i.e., institution b. However, she gets rejected because her score is lower than both





. Since the OBC
seat remains vacant in b, it is set to an open-category position so that b now has two open-
category positions.
In the third iteration of DA, both a and b have two open-category positions. i1 and i2
apply to these and they are both assigned to open-category positions. i3 and i4 apply to b







Note that when i4 truthfully reveals her OBC category membership she was assigned
to institution a, which is her second choice. However, when she does not reveal her OBC
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category membership she is assigned to her top choice, institution b. 
The purpose of the reservation policy is to protect the members of SC, ST, and OBC
communities when they claim their privilege. This example, however, shows that it is pos-
sible for a reserved category member to get assigned to a better institution by not claiming
her affirmative action privilege. This is in sharp contrast with the spirit of affirmative ac-
tion. The main cause of this is the way de-reservation policy is implemented. Re-running
the deferred acceptance algorithm to de-reserve unfilled slots from categories—which are
allowed to be de-reserved to their “parent” categories—may create unnecessary rejection
chains that in turn affect the distribution of positions over categories. This unnecessary
change may incentivize individuals to misreport their caste membership to get a better as-
signment. We can, therefore, conclude that the de-reservation scheme in the multi-run DA
mechanism may work against the core principle of the affirmative action policy.
Through Example 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, we reveal the unintended consequences
of this particular de-reservation process. In the next section, we propose two different de-
reservation schemes that will fix these shortcomings. Though we use the technical school
admissions in India as our primary application, our proposals can be invoked in other re-
source allocation problems via reserve systems.
3 Backward and Forward Transfers Choice Rules
In this section, we formulate two classes of choice rules to implement both reserve and
de-reservation policies. The deferred acceptance mechanism with respect to these choice
rules will be
• strategy-proof, and
• incentive compatible for reserve category membership revelation.
Before introducing these choice rules, we first define the incentive compatibility for reserve
category membership revelation for choice rules.
Definition 4. A choice rule C is incentive compatible for reserve category membership
revelation if, for any given set of individuals A ⊆ I and any member of reserve category
r ∈ R individual i ∈ A, if i <C(A)when i reports her membership to category r , then i <C(A)
when i does not report her membership to r .
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To put it differently, if individual i announces that ti =GC and she is chosen from the set
of individuals, then she must be chosen from the same set when she announces ti = r ∈ R.
3.1 Backward Transfers Choice Rules
Given a set of applicants A⊆ I, a vector of reported reserve category membership T = (ti)i∈I ,





backward transfers choice rule CBTs selects applicants in multiple iterations as follows:





. Let τ1 be the number of vacant OBC seats. Update the number
of open-category and OBC positions by transferring τ1 many positions from OBC to open-




s∈S be the vector of updated distributions of positions over reserve
categories.
Iteration n (n≥2). Run the choice rule with reserves CRess with the updated distribution









. Let τn be the number of vacant OBC seats. Update the number of open-





s∈S be the vector of updated distributions of positions over reserve cate-
gories.
The choice process terminates when there is no vacant OBC seat at any institution. The
set of applicants who are selected in the last iteration—call it N—are the applicants who
are selected by the backward transfers choice rule. That is,




Proposition 3. Backward transfers choice rules are incentive compatible for reserve cate-
gory membership revelation.
Proof. See Appendix. 
We now present the DA algorithm with respect to backward transfers choice rules.
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be the vector of reported preference relations and T= (ti)i∈I be the reported
profile of reserve category membership of individuals. Given the backward transfers choice
function of each institution s ∈ S, CBTs —the outcome of the DA algorithm with respect to
the backward transfers choice rules defined above is computed as follows:
Step 1. Each individual in I applies to his top choice institution. Let A1s be the set of





and rejects the rest.
Step n≥ 2. Each individual who was rejected in the previous step applies to the best
institution that has not rejected him. Let Ans be the union of the set of individuals who
were tentatively held by institution s at the end of Step n−1 and the set of new proposers






The multi-run DA mechanism handles de-reservation by re-running the DA mecha-
nism on all applicants to update the distribution of positions over categories by transferring
unfilled OBC positions to the open-category, which is filled first according to the prece-
dence sequence. In the DA mechanism with respect to backward transfers choice rules, de-
reservations are handled by re-running the institutions’ choice rules until there is no more
vacancy to be de-reserved. Our first result shows that the DA mechanism with respect to
these choice rules eliminates the possibility of manipulation via preference misreporting.
Theorem 1. The DA mechanism with respect to backward transfer choice rules is strategy-
proof.
Proof. See Appendix. 
We prove Theorem 1 by showing that backward transfers choice rules satisfy classical
substitutability and size monotonicity conditions. Substitutability requires that no two ap-
plicants i and j are complementary in the sense that the availability of j makes applicant
i more desirable. Mathematically, a choice rule C is substitutable if for all i, j ∈ I, and
A ⊆ I \ {i, j},
i < C (A∪ {i}) =⇒ i < C (A∪ {i, j}) .
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Size monotonicity requires that the number of chosen individuals weakly increases if
the set of applicants expands. That is, a choice rule C is size monotonic if
A ⊂ A′ ⊆ I =⇒| C (A) | ≤ | C (A′) | .
Similar to the multi-run DA algorithm, under the DA algorithm with backward transfers
vacant slots are transferred from the OBC category to the open-category that precedes the
OBC category in the processing sequence. However, the two mechanisms are very differ-
ent. According to the multi-run DA algorithm, the DA procedure is re-run with updated
capacities of reserve categories on all individuals. According to the DA with respect to
backward transfers choice rules, the procedure is run only once. De-reservations are han-
dled by re-iterating the choice procedures of institutions in the course of the DA algorithm.
Unlike the multi-run DA mechanism, the DA mechanism with respect to backward
transfers choice rules gives applicants incentive to report their reserve category membership
truthfully.
Theorem 2. The DA mechanism with respect to backward transfers choice rules is incen-
tive compatible for reserve category membership revelation.
Proof. See Appendix. 
There is a great benefit to re-running the choice rules rather than the DA algorithm to
de-reserve vacant OBC positions. Consider the market in the proof of Proposition 1 with






where individuals i1 and i3 receive their top choices, while individuals i2 and i4 are as-
signed to their second choices under the true preferences. The outcome of the DA under





, where all indi-
vidual are assigned to their top choices. By re-iterating the choice rule rather than the DA
algorithm, some unnecessary rejections chains are prevented. Our next result states that
this observation can be generalized.
Theorem 3. The DA mechanism with respect to backward transfers choice rules (weakly)
Pareto dominates the multi-run DA mechanism at every problem P.
Proof. See Appendix. 
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Our proof for Theorem 3 is elegant. For the sake of brevity, we provide a sketch. We
show that the outcome of the multi-run DA at a given preference profile P = (Pi)i∈I is stable




s∈S at the same
preference profile P given the profile of individuals’ reserve category membership profile.
Since backward transfers choice rules satisfy substitutes and size monotonicity properties,
the DA outcome is individual-optimal. Given that multi-run DA and the DA with respect
to backward transfers choice rules are different mechanisms, individual-optimality of the
DA with respect to backward transfers choice rules implies that it Pareto dominates the
multi-run DA.
Re-iterating the choice rule with reserves within the steps of a single-run DA rather
than re-iterating the DA algorithm to update the distribution of positions not only gives ap-
plicants incentives to state their preferences truthfully, but also achieves a better outcomes
for individuals at every problem. Therefore, using the DA with backward transfer choice
rules is clearly a better choice between the two approaches.
We also have the following important corollary from the well-known Rural Hospital
Theorem.
Corollary 1. At every preference profile P = (Pi)i∈I , the number of individuals who are
matched under the multi-run DA is the same as the number of individuals who are matched
under the DA with respect to backward transfers choice rules.
3.2 Forward Transfers Choice Rules
We now introduce forward transfers choice rules, according to which vacant positions
are transferred from OBC to open-category by filling these extra open-category positions
at the very end of the processing sequence. That is, the processing sequence becomes
Open→ (SC − ST −OBC) → Open. Forward transfer choice rules add a third stage to
the choice rules with reserves. In the third stage, the surplus OBC positions are allo-









, a set of applicants A ⊆ I, and a vector of reported reserve category
membership T = (t(i))i∈I , the set of chosen applicants CFTs (A,qs), is computed as follows:
Stage 1. Only open-category seats are considered. Applicants are chosen one at a time
following s up to the capacity qOPs .
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Stage 2. For each reserve category t ∈ R, applicants are chosen one at a time following
ts up to the capacity q
t
s. Let λ be the number of vacant OBC positions.
Stage 3. Applicants are chosen one at a time following s up to the capacity λ.
We now give an example to show how the forward transfers choice rule is run.
Example 2. Let us reconsider the institution with ten positions in Example 1, where the
initial distribution of positions over reserve categories is (5,1,1,3). We will find the set
of chosen individuals with respect to the forward transfers choice rule CFTs as follows:
The first five positions, i.e., open-category positions are assigned to {i1,i2,i3,i4,i5}. The
reserved SC and ST positions are assigned to i7 and i8, respectively. One of the reserved
OBC positions is assigned to i6. Two reserved OBC positions remain vacant. These two
positions are made open-category positions and individuals i9 and i10 are assigned to them.
All individuals are chosen under the choice rule CFTs while individuals i9 and i10 were not
chosen under CBTs .
Examples 1 and 2 reveal the crucial difference between the backward and forward trans-
fers choice rules, which we discuss in detail in Section 4.
Proposition 4. Forward transfers choice rules are incentive compatible for reserve cate-
gory membership revelation.
Proof. See Appendix. 
We now present the DA algorithm with respect to forward transfers choice rules.






be a vector of reported preference relations and T = (t(i))i∈I be a vector of
reported reserve category membership of individuals. Given the forward transfers choice
function of each institution s ∈ S, CFTs —the outcome of the DA algorithm with respect to
the forward transfers choice rules defined above is computed as follows:
Step 1. Each individual in I applies to his top choice institution. Let A1s be the set





and rejects the rest.
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Step n≥ 2. Each individual who was rejected in the previous step applies to the best
institution that has not rejected him. Let Ans be the union of the set of individuals who
were tentatively held by institution s at the end of Step n−1 and the set of new proposers






The DA mechanism with respect to forward transfers choice rules gives applicants in-
centives to submit their true rankings over institutions.
Theorem 4. The DA mechanism with respect to forward transfer choice rules are strategy-
proof.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Moreover, the DA mechanism with respect to forward transfers choice rules guarantees
that reporting reserve category membership truthfully can never hurt.
Theorem 5. The DA mechanism with respect to forward transfer choice rules is incentive
compatible for reserve category membership revelation.
Proof. See Appendix. 
4 Comparing Backward and Forward Transfers Choice
Rules
To motivate our comparison, we start with the following example.
Example 3. Suppose there are eight individuals with the following reserved categories and
exam scores:










Consider an institution s with seven positions, and the following initial distribution of po-
sitions over categories (OP,SC,ST,OBC) = (3,1,1,2).
We first compute CFTs (I,qs). In the open-category i1,i2, and i3 are selected, i.e., the
three highest scoring candidates. For the reserved SC seat i4 is selected. For the reserved
ST seat i7 is selected. For the reserved OBC seats, only i6 is chosen and one OBC seat
remains unfilled. Therefore, this vacant seat is made an open-category seat to be filled at
the end. Among the unassigned individuals i5 has the highest score, and she is selected for
the extra open-category seat. Thus, we have
CFTs (I,qs) = {i1,i2,i3,i4,i5,i6,i7}
Note that the only individual who was not chosen is i8, who has the lowest score.
We now compute CBTs (I,qs). In the first iteration, we compute C
Res
s (I,qs), i1, i2, and i3
are selected in the open-category, i4 is selected in the reserved SC category, i7 is selected
in the reserved ST category, and the only OBC individual i6 is chosen in the reserved OBC
category. One reserved OBC seat remains vacant. Therefore, it is made an open-category
position by altering the vector of slot distribution across reserve categories. The new vector
is q2s = (4,1,1,1).




as follows: i1, i2 , i3, and i4 are selected
in the open-category, i8 is selected in the reserved SC category, i7 is selected in the reserved
ST category, and i6 is chosen in the reserved OBC category. Since there is no vacancy in
the OBC category, we terminate the procedure. Thus, the set of chosen individuals is
CBTs (I,qs) = {i1,i2,i3,i4,i6,i7,i8}
Note that CFTs (I,qs) \C
BT




s (I,qs) = {i8}. So, i5 is re-
placed with i8 under CBTs (I,qs). The reason for this replacement is that the backward trans-
ferred OBC slot is taken by an SC individual i4. In turn, the lowest scoring individual who
belongs to SC is now chosen for the reserved SC category.
In this example, CFTs (I,qs) selects a better set of individuals than C
BT
s (I,qs)with respect
to merit. In this section, we generalize this example and compare the outcomes of forward
and backward transfers choice rules with the same initial distribution of positions over
categories on the basis of merit.
Definition 5. A set of individuals I is a better set of individuals on the basis of merit than
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a set of individuals J with | I |≥| J | at institution s if there exists an injection g : J −→ I
such that
1. for all j ∈ J, κ(g( j),s) ≥ κ( j,s), and,
2. there exists j ∈ J such that κ(g( j),s) > κ( j,s).
We now introduce a criterion to compare two choice rules on the basis of merit.
Definition 6. A choice rule C merit-based dominates another choice rule C ′ if, for all sets
of individuals I ⊆ I, either C(I) ⊇ C
′




Note that, according to Definition 6, if a choice rule C always chooses a super set of
what choice rule C
′
chooses from the same given set of individuals, then C is considered
more meritorious. This can be interpreted as “more is better” and is consistent with the
main motivation of the recent admissions reform in India. Policymakers’ primary goal was
to reduce the number of wasted positions. Our next result compares backward and forward
choice rules according to our merit-based domination criterion.
Theorem 6. Forward transfer choice rule CFTs (·,qs) merit-based dominates the backward
transfer choice rule CBT (·,qs).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Theorem 6 suggests that, if there is only one institution, using forward transfers choice
rules is better than using the backward transfers choice rules because the former assigns
not only a (weakly) higher number but also a more meritorious set of individuals. This
comparison does not hold for the outcomes of the DA mechanisms with respect to backward
and forward transfers choice rules, respectively. We illustrate this point below with an
example.
Example 4. Consider two institutions S = {a,b}. Institution a has four positions with the
initial distribution vector over categories (1,1,1,1). Institution b has one position that is
an open-category position. There are five individuals I = {i1,i2,i3,i4,i5} with the following
test score ordering at both institutions:
κ(i1,s) > κ(i2,s) > κ(i3,s) > κ(i4,s) > κ(i5,s),
23
for both s = a and s = b. The individuals’ reserve category membership reports are as
follows: t(i1) = GC, t(i2) = SC, t(i3) = ST , t(i4) = ST , and t(i5) = ST . The individuals’
preferences are given below:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
a a a a a
b b b b ∅
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
We first compute the outcome of the DA under backward transfers choice rules. In
the first iteration of DA, all individuals apply to institution a in the first step. i1 is chosen
from open-category, i2 is chosen from SC, i3 is chosen from ST, and i4 and i5 are rejected
because the only available position is the reserved OBC position. Individual i4 applies to
institution b in the second step, and is chosen for the open-category position. Individual
i5 remains unassigned. Since the reserved OBC position in a remains vacant, it is set as
an open-category position and we move to the second iteration. The updated distribution
vector of institution a becomes (2,1,1,0).
In the second iteration of DA, all individuals apply to institution a in the first step.
Individuals i1 and i2 are assigned to open-category positions. i5 is assigned to a SC position,
and i3 is assigned to a ST position. i4 gets rejected and applies to institution b in the second
step and is chosen for the open-category position. Therefore, the outcome of the DA under






We now compute the outcome of the DA algorithm under forward transfers choice
rules. In the first step, all candidates apply to a. i1 is chosen from open-category, i2 is
chosen from SC, and i3 is chosen from ST. Since there is no OBC candidate, the reserved
OBC seat remains unfilled and is set as an open-category position. Among the remaining
individuals, i4 is assigned to this position and i5 gets rejected from a. Since there is no





Consider institution b. The number of individuals assigned to b in the DA algorithm
under forward transfers choice rules, which is zero, is strictly less than the number of in-
dividuals assigned to it by the DA algorithm under backward transfers choice rules. More-
over, the set that b is assigned to, {i4}, merit-based dominates the set b is assigned to under
the forward transfers choice rule, i.e., ∅.
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Our next result shows that there is no Pareto comparison between the outcomes of DA
algorithms with respect to backward and forward choice rules, respectively.
Proposition 5. The DA mechanism with forward transfer choice rules and the DA mecha-
nism with backward transfer choice rules are Pareto incomparable.
Proof. Consider an institution s with four positions, where the initial distribution over re-










Suppose there are five individuals I = {i1,i2,i3,i4,i5} to be considered. Individuals i1 and i3
are members of GC, individuals i2 and i5 are members of SC, and individual i4 is a member
of ST. The merit scores of individuals are given by
κ(i1,s) > κ(i2,s) > κ(i3,s) > κ(i4,s) > κ(i5,s).
In the first iteration of the backwards transfers choice rule, i1 is assigned to an open-
category position, i2 is assigned to a reserved SC position, and i4 is assigned to a reserved
ST position. The reserved OBC position remains vacant, and is set as an open-category seat
for the second iteration. For the second iteration, the distribution over reserve categories be-
comes (2,1,1,0). Therefore, in the second iteration, i1 and i2 are assigned to open-category
seats, i4 is assigned to the reserved ST seat, and i5 is assigned to the reserved SC seat.
Therefore, the backward transfers choice rule selects the set {i1,i2,i4,i5}.
The forward capacity transfers choice rules assigns i1 to an open-category position, i2
to the reserved SC position, and i4 to the reserved ST position. The reserved OBC position
remains vacant, and therefore is set to an open-category seat. This new open-category
position is assigned to i3 since she has the highest merit score among all individuals who
were not yet assigned. Thus, the forward transfers choice rule selects the set {i1,i2,i3,i4}.
Individual i5 receives a better outcome under the DA with respect to the backward trans-
fers choice rule, while individual i3 receives a better outcome under the DA with respect to
the forward transfers choice rule. Therefore, they are Pareto incomparable. 
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5 Relation to the Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on resource allocation problems in India with affir-
mative action constraints that have been recently studied by Aygün and Turhan (2017, 2020,
and 2021), Baswana et al. (2018 and 2019), and Sönmez and Yenmez (2020 and 2021).
We have already discussed the differences between this work and that of Baswana et al.
(2018, 2019). Sönmez and Yenmez (2020, 2021) assume away de-reservations altogether,
while de-reservation policies are the main focus of this paper. Aygün and Turhan (2020
and 2021) use forward transfers choice rules. This paper compares different de-reservation
schemes, including the forward transfers choice rules. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the first to compare and analyze different de-reservation policies in detail.
This paper contributes to the literature on lexicographic choice rules in the context
of allocating multiple identical objects under a capacity constraint. Lexicographic choice
rules are also studied by Kominers and Sönmez (2016), Chambers and Yenmez (2017,
2018), Westkamp (2013), Aygün and Turhan (2020, 2021), Echenique and Yenmez (2015),
Doğan (2017), and Doğan and Yıldız (2020), among others.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on controlled school choice and diversity
considerations in matching markets that are also studied by, among others, Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez (2003), Biro et al. (2010), Ehlers (2010), Hafalir et al. (2013), Ehlers
et al. (2014), Westkamp (2013), Echenique and Yenmez (2015), Kamada and Kojima
(2015), Aygün and Bó (2021), Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017), Nguyen and Vohra (2019),
Echenique et al. (2020), and Aziz et al. (2021).
Finally, our paper contributes to the market design literature, where economists study
policy relevant real-world allocation problems in different contexts. Some examples of
such allocation problems include refugee resettlement (Andersson 2017, Delacrétaz et al.
2020, and Jones and Teytelboym 2017), assignment of arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra
2013, and Schummer and Abizada 2017), course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver 2010, Bud-
ish 2011, and Budish and Cantillon 2012), and organ allocation and exchange (Roth et al.
2014, Ergin et al. 2017 and 2020), among many others.
6 Conclusion
This paper discusses unintended consequences of de-reservation policy implemented for
admissions to technical universities in India to point out that how de-reservation policies
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are implemented is consequential. We introduce new de-reservation policies by embed-
ding them into institutions’ choice rules—backward and forward capacity transfers choice
rules— to alleviate these consequences. We propose the DA mechanism with respect to
these choice rules and show that it is strategy-proof and incentive compatible for reserve
category membership revelation. We compare backward and forward transfers choice rules
and show that the latter not only assigns a (weakly) higher number of individuals, but also
a better set of individuals on the basis of merit. We believe that these choice rules can be
implemented in many real-world allocation problems in which de-reservation is necessary.
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7 APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that individual i, who belongs to reserve category r ∈
R, is not chosen by CBTs (·,qs) when she reports her membership to category r , that is ti = r .
We need to show that she is not chosen when she reports t′i =GC. When i reports ti = r and
not chosen, that means i gets rejected for open-category positions in every iteration of CBTs .
When i reports t′i = GC, she gets rejected for open category positions in every iteration
because, she cannot change the set of applicants who apply for open-category positions
and the number of unfilled OBC seats that are transferred to open-category at the end of
each iteration.
Before proving Theorem 1, we first state and prove a lemma that will be useful. This
lemma also helps to understand the dynamics of the backward transfers choice rules.
Lemma 1. Given a set of applicants A ⊆ I and a vector of initial distribution of positions
over categories qs of institution s ∈ S, N is the last iteration of the backward transfers











\AOBC |= τ1, where τ1 is the number of unfilled













Condition (1) says that the number of non-OBC individuals who are chosen for open-
category positions in the N th iteration, but are not chosen for open-category positions in
the first iteration of the multi-run DA, is exactly equal to τ1, which is the number of vacant
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OBC positions at the end of the first iteration of the multi-run DA. Condition (2) says that
all OBC positions are made open-category positions at the beginning of iteration N . That
is, all OBC positions that are made open-category positions at iteration N −1 are taken by
OBC candidates. Hence, the remaining reserved OBC positions are now vacant, and made
open category positions at the beginning of iteration N .











)OBC , then it means τn = 0
by construction. That is, the number of vacant OBC seats at iteration N is 0. Hence, by
definition, N is the final iteration.










\ AOBC |= τ1. First, note that the














Since the total number of OBC and open-category positions in every iteration remains

































































































which implies τN = 0. Thus, N is the last iteration.
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(⇒) Let N be the last iteration of CBTs (A,qs). Toward a contradiction, suppose that





























































































































> 0. That means N is not the final iteration. This is a contra-
diction.






































































































which implies that τN > 0. Hence, N is not the final iteration. This is a contradiction. This
ends the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove Theorem 1 by showing that backward transfers choice
rules satisfy both substitutability and size monotonicity.
Substitutability. Consider i, j ∈ I and A ⊂ I \{i, j} such that i <CBTs (A∪ {i}). We need
to show that i < CBTs (A∪ {i, j}).
Let τk and τ̃k denote the number of vacant OBC positions at the end of iteration k
under CBTs (A∪ {i},qs) and C
BT
s (A∪ {i, j},qs), respectively. Let N and Ñ be the last steps
of CBTs (A∪ {i},qs) and C
BT










)OP and (qÑs )OP are the capacities of open-category at the
last steps of CBTs (A∪ {i},qs) and C
BT
s (A∪ {i, j},qs), respectively. Let At ⊆ A∪ {i} denotes
the set of individuals who belong to reserve category t ∈ R = {SC,ST,OBC}. For each
t ∈ R, define A
′








If i < CBTs (A∪ {i} ,qs), then we know that i is not in the top
(
qNs
)OP in the set A∪ {i}.




in the set A∪ {i, j}. So, i cannot be chosen for an
open-category position from A∪ {i, j}.
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We now show that i cannot be chosen for a reserve category t(i) ∈ R seat. First, suppose
that t(i) = OBC. Since i was not chosen for an OBC position from the set A∪ {i}, and
when j is added to the set A∪ {i}, i cannot be chosen for an OBC position because adding
j (weakly) increases the competition for OBC positions.
Now, suppose that t(i) ∈ {SC,ST}. The capacities of reserved SC and ST categories are
the same for the choice processes starting with A∪ {i} and A∪ {i, j} in every iteration of
the CBTs . Moreover, we have













for both t = SC and t = ST . That is, the competition for the SC and ST positions will
be (weakly) higher in the choice process starting with A∪ {i, j} than the choice process






)OP) , we can conclude that i will not be chosen for reserved t(i) position






. Therefore, i cannot be chosen for reserved t(i) ∈
R positions. This ends our proof of substitutability.
Size monotonicity. Consider i ∈ I and A ⊆ I \ {i}. We need to show that | CBTs (A) |≤|
CBTs (A∪ {i}) |. We consider following two cases:
Case 1. | A |≤ qOPs +qOBCs . In this case, all individuals in A will be chosen. When i is
added to the set A, the number of chosen individuals increases by one and becomes | A | +1,
if | A |< qOPs + q
OBC




s , since the number of chosen individuals is
| A |, adding i to the set A does not change the number of chosen individuals.












s , where A
′








t ∈ {SC,ST}. Note that N represents the last iteration of the backward transfers choice rule.
In other words, the choice rule CBTs behaves as a q-responsive choice function if the num-
ber of remaining SC and ST individuals after open-category positions are filled are at least









s , the number of chosen individuals will be qs and adding










s , the number of chosen individuals from A∪{i} either stays the
same or increases by one.
Substitutability and size monotonicity of backward transfers choice rules imply strategy-
proofness of the DA with respect to backward transfers choice rules, following Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005). This ends our proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. We adapt the following definition from Definition 8 of Afacan
(2017): A choice rule C
′
s is an improvement over a choice rule Cs for individual i if, for
any set of individuals A (i) if i ∈ Cs (A), then i ∈ C
′
s (A), and (ii) if i < Cs (A) ∪C
′
s (A), then
Cs (A) = C
′
s (A). Consider a reserve category r ∈ R member i. Let C
BT
s be the backward
transfers choice rule individual i faces when she does not report her category r member-
ship, and C̃BTs be the backward transfers choice rule individual i faces when she reports
her membership to r . Our Proposition 3 states that C̃BTs is an improvement over C
BT
s for
individual i according to the given definition of improvement.





an improvement over C for individual i, ψ(P,C
′
)Riψ(P,C).
Theorem 2 of Afacan (2017) states that the generalized DA respects improvements if
choice rules of institutions satisfy the unilateral substitutes of Hatfield and Kojima (2010),
the irrelevance of rejected contracts of Aygün and Sönmez (2013), and the size mono-
tonicity of Hatfield and Milgrom (2015). As we show in Theorem 1, backward transfers
choice rules satisfy substitutability. In our setting without contracts, substitutability and
unilateral substitutability are equivalent. Moreover, backward transfers choice rules satisfy
size monotonicity, which—in conjunction with substitutability—implies the irrelevance of
rejected contracts condition. Therefore, Afacan (2017)’s Theorem 2 hold in our setting
with backward transfers choice rules. Then, we can conclude that when individuals report
their reserved category membership, they can never be hurt under the DA mechanism with
respect to backward transfers choice rules.
Proof of Theorem 3. As it was shown in the proof of Theorem 1, backward transfers
choice rules are substitutable and size monotonic. Therefore, by Theorem 4 of Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005), the generalized DA outcome is the individual-optimal stable out-
come, where stability is defined with respect to a profile of backward transfers choice rules(
CBTs
)
s∈S . That is, each applicant weakly prefers the outcome of the generalized DA to her
assignment in any other stable matching.
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, where L denotes the last iteration of the DA in multi-run DA algorithm. We




Individual Rationality for Individuals. Since the preference profile in the multi-run
DA and the DA with respect to backward transfers choice rules are the same, for every
individual i ∈ I, v(i)Ri∅.
Individual Rationality for Institutions. We need to show that the outcome of the multi-
run DA at preference profile P is individually rational for institution s ∈ S with respect to its
backward transfers choice rule CBTs , for all institutions s ∈ S. That is, C
BT
s (v (s)) = v (s) for
all institutions s ∈ S, where v(s) denotes the set of applicants who are matched to institution
s under the multi-run DA.
We will first prove a lemma that will be the key to prove individual rationality for insti-
tutions. We introduce the necessary notation first. Consider a set of applicants A ⊆ I. Let
ASC , AST , and AOBC be sets of individuals who belong to SC, ST, and OBC, respectively, in
the set A. In the backward transfers choice rules, let qs = q1s be the initial vector of capacities
of categories, N be the last iteration, and qNs denote the vector of capacities of categories at
institution s ∈ S in the last iteration of CBTs . By definition, C
BT
s (A,qs) = C






)OP) the set of individuals chosen from the open category given a set
of applicants A , and capacity
(
qns
)OP of the open-category at iteration n of the backward
transfers choice rule. This choice rule selects applicants following the priority ordering s




By Lemma 1, CBTs (A,qs) is finalized as soon as either one of the conditions in Lemma




























































































































⊆ CBTs (A,qs) .





















because there are no de-reservations from categories SC and ST, and hence, capacities of















which completes our proof. Hence, the outcome of the multi-run DA at preference profile
P, i.e., the matching v, is individually rational for every institution with respect to their
backward transfers choice rules.
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No Blocking. Toward a contradiction, suppose that (i,s) is a blocking pair. That is,




s , and A
OBC
s denote the set of applicants in v(s)
that are members of SC, ST, and OBC, respectively. There are three cases to consider.
(i) OBC = t(i). Since sPiv(i) and OBC applicants get weakly better of in multi-run
DA, we can conclude that individual i applied to s and get rejected by s in every iteration
of the multi-run DA. Since i was never chosen, we know that the number of chosen OBC
members is at least as high as the initial capacity of the OBC category in every iteration.
Therefore, | AOBCs |≥ q
OBC
s . Moreover, individual i is not in top q
OP
s candidates in the set
v(s) and every applicant in AOBCs has higher merit score than i. Thus, i cannot be chosen
from v(s)∪ {i} in the backward transfers choice rule CBTs . This contradicts with (i,s) being
a blocking pair.
(ii) SC = t(i) or ST = t(i). Let us consider SC = t(i). Since sPiv(i) and SC applicants
get weakly better of in multi-run DA, we can conclude that individual i applied to s and get
rejected by s in every step of the multi-run DA. Since i is not chosen by s, all candidates
in AGCs ∪ A
SC
s have higher scores than i. Moreover, there is no unfilled seat at reserved SC
category. Since adding SC candidates who have lower scores than candidates in AGCs ∪ A
SC
s
to v(s) cannot change the capacity vector of the final iteration of CBTs , i cannot be chosen
from v(s)∪ {i}. This is a contradiction. The case where ST = t(i) is proved similarly.
(iii) {GC} = t(i). Since sPiv(i) and GC applicants get weakly better of in multi-run DA,
individual i applied to s and get rejected by s in every iteration of the multi-run DA. Since i




s , i.e., number of open-category seats
in the final iteration of the multi-run DA. Therefore, i cannot be chosen from v(s) ∪ {i}.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, there is no blocking pair.
We have shown that the outcome of the multi-run DA at problem P, i.e., matching v,
is stable with respect to backward transfers choice rules CBT . Therefore, the applicant-
optimal stable (with respect to backward transfers choice rules CBT ) matching µ Pareto
dominates matching v.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that individual i, who is a reserve category r ∈ R mem-
ber, is not chosen by CFTs (·,qs) when she reports her membership to category r ∈ R, that
is ti = r . We need to show that she is not chosen when she reports t
′
i = GC. When i re-
ports ti = r and not chosen, that means i gets rejected for open-category positions under
CFTs . When i reports t
′
i = GC, she gets rejected for open category positions, because she
cannot change the set of applicants who apply for open-category positions and the number
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of unfilled OBC seats that are transferred to open-category to be filled at the very end.
Proof of Theorem 4. In forward transfer choice rules, vacant OBC seats are transferred
to open-category that succeed the reserve category OBC. We can write the capacity of the
extra open-category positions that are filled at the end as
qEOP(rOP,rSC,rST,rOBC) = rOBC,
where rOP, rSC , rST , and rOBC denote the number of unfilled slots in categories open-
category, SC, ST, and OBC, respectively. This choice protocol straightforwardly satisfies
the monotonicity and non-excessive reduction properties of Westkamp (2013), which imply
the substitutability and size monotonicity of forward transfers choice rules. By Theorem 2
of Westkamp (2013), the DA with respect to forward transfers choice rules is strategy-proof
for individuals.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let CFTs be the forward transfers choice rule individual i faces when
she does not report her category r membership, and C̃FTs be the forward transfers choice rule
individual i faces when she reports her membership to r . Our Proposition 4 states that C̃FTs
is an improvement over CFTs for individual i according to the improvement notion defined
in the proof of Theorem 2. Since forward transfers choice rules satisfy substitutability and
size monotonicity, and hence the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition, we can invoke
Theorem 2 of Afacan (2017). Therefore, when individuals report their reserved category
membership, they can never be hurt under the DA mechanism with respect to forward
transfers choice rules.




















OBC ) and (qOPs ,qSCs ,qSTs ,qOBCs ,λ) be the final capacity vectors of
categories under the backward and forward transfers choice rules, CBTs and C
FT
s , respec-
tively. Note that N denotes the final iteration of CBTs and λ denotes the number of unfilled
OBC seats that are converted into open-category positions under CFTs .
Let At ⊆ A denotes the set of individuals who belong to reserve category t ∈ R =
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{SC,ST,OBC}. For each t ∈ R, define
A
′
































































where R is the set of remaining individuals, i.e., R = A\CRess (A,qs).
Since we have (qNs )
OP ≥ qOPs and each category chooses individuals following the merit



















is the top qts candidates, we have the following:



























⊆ CBTs (A,qs). That is, every SC and ST individual who are chosen
from the reserved SC and ST categories under the forward transfers choice rule are also














for t ∈ {OP,SC,ST}. By Lemma 1, we have either
(i) mOP +mSC +mST = τ1, or
(ii) mOP +mSC +mST < τ1 and CBTs (A,qs) = A.
In the case of (ii), we have | A |< qOPs + q
OBC
s . This implies C
FT
s (A,qs) = A. For the
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|= qOPs + q
OBC
s − τ1 (4)
We also have the following inequalities


























Given the equalities (1) and (2), summing over equalities (3) and (4) and inequalities (5)
and (6), we have the following inequality:
−τ1 < | CFTs (A,qs) | − | C
OP
s (R,τ1) | + | C
BT
s (A,qs) |< mSC +mST − τ1 (7)
There are two cases to consider given inequality (7):
Case 1. | COPs (R,τ1) |=| R |. In this case, we have CFTs (A,qs) = A ⊇ CBTs (A,qs). This
implies | CFTs (A,qs) |≥=| C
BT
s (A,qs) |.
Case 2. | COPs (R,τ1) |= τ1. In this case, from inequality (7), we have
0 < | CFTs (A,qs) | − | CBTs (A,qs) |< mSC +mST,
which also implies | CFTs (A,qs) |≥=| C
BT
s (A,qs) |.
Therefore, for any given set A ⊆ I, the forward transfers choice rule selects at least as
many individuals backward transfers choice rule selects, i.e.,
| CFTs (A,qs) |≥| C
BT
s (A,qs) | .
We now show that CFTs (A,qs) merit-based dominates C
BT
s (A,qs). First, note that we










where R = A \CRess (A,qs) and τ
1 is the number of unfilled OBC positions that are made
open-category positions (and, filled at the very end of the processing sequence). We have
already shown that if i ∈ CRess (A,qs), then i ∈ C
BT
s (A,qs). That is, any individual who
are chosen either in Stage 1 or Stage 2 of the forward transfers choice rule is chosen by
the backward transfer choice rule. We will now construct an injection g : CBTs (A,qs) →
CFTs (A,qs). For all individuals in C
Res
s (A,qs), which is a subset of both C
FT
s (A,qs) and
CBTs (A,qs), we set g(i) = i.
Since we have | CFTs (A,qs) |≥| C
BT
s (A,qs) |, we also have
| CFTs (A,qs) \C
Res




s (A,qs) | .
We call CFTs (A,qs) \C
Res






, which is a q-responsive choice func-
tion. That is, among the remaining individuals either all of them or the top τ1 of them will
be chosen following the merit scores.
Given the set of individuals CBTs (A,qs) \C
Res





map the top-scoring individual in CBTs (A,qs) \C
Res
s (A,qs), call her j1, to the top-scoring
individual in CFTs (A,qs) \C
Res
s (A,qs), call her j̃1. That is, g( j1) = j̃1. We map the second
top-scoring individual in CBTs (A,qs) \C
Res
s (A,qs), call her j2, to the second top-scoring
individual in CFTs (A,qs) \C
Res
s (A,qs), call her j̃2. That is, g( j2) = j̃2. We process in the
same fashion, until we exhaust all individuals in the set CBTs (A,qs)\C
Res
s (A,qs), in K steps.




, then we will have
CFTs (A,qs) \C
Res






CFTs (A,qs) ⊇ C
BT
s (A,qs) .
In this case, we are done according to the merit-based domination definition. Otherwise,




, then there must exist an individual in CFTs (A,qs)\C
Res
s (A,qs),
call her g( j
′









, which is a q-responsive choice function. Therefore, in this case,
CFTs (A,qs) | is a better set of individuals on the basis of merit than C
BT
s (A,qs). This ends
our proof.
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